Project Zero: Returning Xerox to Essentials
Status: Build in Progress Target Price: $XX.XX (Implied X.X% Upside) Current Price: [Live Data] Verdict: Strong Buy (Asset Play)
1. Executive Summary: The "Melting Ice Cube" Opportunity
Xerox Holdings Corporation (XRX) presents a classic "melting ice cube" scenario—a legacy technology incumbent caught in a secular decline, mismanaged by a board prioritizing illusion over reality.
For the past five years, current leadership has overseen a catastrophic destruction of value:
- Revenue Collapse: From $9.7B in 2019 to $6.6B (TTM), a 32% decline.
- Profit Evaporation: Operating income has plummeted from >$1.1B to ~$350M.
- Multiple Compression: The market has rightfully compressed the multiple to <5x FCF, pricing the business for bankruptcy.
Our Thesis: The market is wrong about the terminal value, but correct about the current trajectory. Xerox owns an irreplaceable install base and generated ~$500M in Free Cash Flow (FCF) despite inept management.
By rightsizing the cost structure to match the $6B revenue reality—strictly treating this as a "Print Utility" rather than a "Technology Growth Co"—Xerox can double its FCF to $1B/year. At that level, even with zero growth, the equity is worth >$40/share (+200% upside) as a capital return engine.
The "Project Zero" Turnaround Plan
- Operation Redline (Cost): Cut SG&A by $400M. Benchmark data confirms Xerox spends 24% of revenue on overhead vs. peer median of 14%. There is no justification for a shrinking hardware business to maintain a global growth cost structure.
- Capital Discipline (Allocation): Cease all M&A. Cease all "Venture" investments (PARC, FITTLE expansion, 3D Printing). Commit 100% of FCF to aggressive share buybacks and debt reduction.
- Strategic Focus (Strategy): Admit Print is declining. Manage for yield. Raise prices on the "sticky" service contracts (60% of Revenue) and stop chasing low-margin hardware volume.
2. Business Autopsy: The Secular Decline
Where did the $3 Billion go?
The narrative that "Print is Dead" is only half true. Print is declining, but Xerox's revenue collapse is self-inflicted.
The 5-Year Collapse (2019-2024)
A review of the income statement reveals the severity of the mismanagement:
| Year | Revenue | Decline | Operating Income | Op Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | $9.06B | - | $1,155M | 12.7% |
| 2020 | $7.02B | -22% | $440M | 6.3% |
| 2021 | $7.03B | +0% | $328M | 4.7% |
| 2022 | $7.10B | +1% | $250M | 3.5% |
| 2023 | $6.99B | -2% | $350M | 5.0% |
| TTM | $6.62B | -5% | $358M | 5.4% |
Analysis:
- COVID Never Ended Analysis: Revenue fell off a cliff in 2020 (-22%) as offices closed. Crucially, it never came back. While physical offices reopened, print volumes structurally reset. Management forecast a "return to growth" that never materialized.
- Margin De-Leverage: As revenue fell, costs remained sticky. Operating margins collapsed from ~13% to ~5%. This is the hallmark of a management team refusing to accept their business is smaller. They kept the "Empire Size" infrastructure for a "Province Size" revenue base.
- The R&D Mirage: Xerox spent ~$300M/year on R&D during this period (cumulative $1.5B). What did shareholders get? A failed 3D printing unit, a spun-out PARC, and zero material new revenue lines. This R&D should be cut to maintenance levels (<$100M).
The Revenue Mix Myth
Management touts "Services" and "Digital" as the future.
- Equipment Sales: ~20% of Revenue. This is the "razor". It is largely unprofitable but necessary to place units.
- Post-Sale Revenue: ~80% of Revenue. This is the "blade" (toner, service, financing).
- The Trap: Xerox is subsidizing hardware placement to chase service revenue that is also declining. They are buying revenue at a loss.
Verdict: The business is shrinking. Stop fighting gravity. Manage for cash.
3. The Cost Crisis: 24% SG&A is Indefensible
According to our proprietary industry benchmarking against 662 Technology peers, Xerox has one of the most bloated cost structures in the hardware sector.
| Metric | XRX (TTM) | Sector Median | The "Fat" |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 33.1% | 59.9% | -26.8% |
| SG&A as % of Rev | 24.5% | 14.2% | +10.3% |
| R&D as % of Rev | 4.3% | 12.0% | N/A (Approprate low spend) |
The $680 Million Opportunity: Xerox generated $6.6B in revenue TTM. It spent $1.62 Billion on SG&A (Selling, General, & Admin). If Xerox simply achieved the Sector Median SG&A efficiency (14.2%), it would spend ~$940M. This is a $680 Million delta.
Even assuming Xerox has higher sales friction due to its direct sales force, a target of 18% SG&A (still above median) would yield $430 Million in incremental operating income.
- Current Operating Income: ~$358M
- Potential Operating Income: ~$788M (+120% Increase)
Where is the money going?
- Legacy Real Estate: Headquarters and regional offices suited for a company 3x the size.
- Direct Sales Structure: A commission-heavy direct sales force that is less efficient than the channel model used by lean competitors like HP.
- "Growth" Initiatives: Marketing and headcount for "Digital Services" and "FITTLE" that produce minimal margin.
Conclusion: Xerox does not have a revenue problem; it has an expense problem. The "Turnaround" does not require a new invention; it requires a calculator and a hatchet.
4. Capital Discipline: Stop the Bleeding
For a company in secular decline, Capital Allocation is the only thing that matters. Management has failed this test by attempting to "buy growth" rather than "return value".
The "Ventures" Black Hole
Xerox has spent an estimated $1.5 Billion over the last 5 years on R&D and "growth investments" (PARC, Elem Additive, FITTLE).
- Result: 3D Printing business sold for pennies. PARC donated/spun out. FITTLE causing bad debt exposure.
- The Pivot: Xerox must dissolve the "Ventures" division immediately. We are not a VC fund; we are a print utility.
The New Capital Policy
We demand a strict capital return policy:
- Maintenance Capex Only: Limit Capex to <1% of Revenue (~$60M).
- Debt Paydown: 50% of FCF to retire debt until leverage is <2x EBITDA.
- Aggressive Buybacks: remaining 50% of FCF to repurchase shares.
- At $10-12/share, Xerox can retire ~10% of the float every year with just $300M in buybacks.
- This creates an "EPS Floor" even if revenue declines.
5. Valuation Scenarios: The Path to $24
The market is pricing Xerox for Chapter 11. We price it for a "Private Equity Style" turnaround in public markets.
Base Case vs. Activist Case
| Metric | Status Quo (2026E) | Project Zero (2026E) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.2B | $6.0B | Shedding unprofitable hardware |
| Op Margin | 5.5% | 13.0% | SG&A cuts (-$450M) |
| Op Income (EBIT) | $341M | $780M | Efficiency gains |
| Interest Exp | ($150M) | ($120M) | Debt paydown |
| Tax (25%) | ($48M) | ($165M) | |
| Net Income | $143M | $495M | |
| Share Count | 125M | 110M | Aggressive Buybacks |
| EPS | $1.14 | $4.50 | 4x EPS Expansion |
| Target Multiple |
The "Free Option"
Even if "Project Zero" only achieves half the targeted cost cuts ($225M), EPS rises to ~$2.80. At a 6x multiple, the stock is worth $16.80 (+50%). At current prices, investors are getting the turnaround option for free.
6. Conclusion & Call to Action
Xerox is not a technology growth stock. It is a deep value asset play that has been miscast by its directors.
The path forward is simple but painful: Shrink to Grow Value. We call on the Board to:
- Announce a formal strategic review of the cost structure targeting $400M in cuts.
- Commit to a 100% Capital Return policy.
- Refresh the board with directors experienced in restructuring, not technology ventures.
Vote FOR the preservation of shareholder value. Vote FOR Project Zero.
Drafted by Golden Door Research | Dec 2025